Freeman’s portrayal of Lee and the ANV can be summarized as follows: (1) Lee and the ANV recovered from the defeat at Gettysburg and remained confident in its ability to counter Union offensives in the spring of 1864; (2) Though continued Union pressure around Petersburg, desertion, and Confederate losses in other areas affected Lee and the ANV physically and psychologically, both had reason to remain confident in the immediate future; (3) The ANV maintained a level of morale sufficient to keep it together in the days following its retreat from Petersburg, until enough Union pressure forced its surrender on April 9. A short survey of recent histories of Lee and the ANV during the final year of the war demonstrates that Freeman’s interpretation cannot simply be characterized as an extension of the Lost Cause paradigm, but anticipates important trends and assumptions that have shaped recent studies.
On the question of Confederate readiness in the spring of 1864, Peter Carmichael has written that Gettysburg represented a “passing storm, tumultuous in nature, but short in duration.” Back safely on Virginia ground, Lee’s men “felt rejuvenated.” Carmichael contends, “nothing had transpired in Pennsylvania to cause his men to doubt the Army of Northern Virginia’s supremacy on home ground.” In a recent study of Confederate numbers in the last year of the war, Steven Newton concludes that not only did the ANV recover by May 1864, “it was potentially stronger than it had been a year earlier.” And Gary Gallagher has recently cited, among other factors, the bond between Lee and his men, the army’s willingness to sacrifice belief in a demoralized enemy, and a belief that the arrival of Grant in the East did not constitute serious concern, as evidence of a “strong sense of optimism” in the ANV.
In his ongoing study of the “Overland Campaign,” Gordon Rhea gives Lee high marks for his ability to continually bring “the Union force to a standstill.” And “even though the Army of Northern Virginia was falling back,” writes Rhea, “its morale remained high.” According to Ernest Furgurson, tactically and strategically, “Lee won the campaign of 1864.” Lee’s success, according to Furgurson, can be attributed to the fact that he “frustrated” Grant’s goals of destroying Lee’s army and capturing Richmond. “By casualty count he [Lee] defeated Grant and Meade at the Wilderness. Then he fought them to better than a draw at Spotsylvania and checked them brilliantly on the North Anna.” Furgurson also argues that along the North Anna, morale remained high in the ANV.
In rejecting the common assumption that Grant’s move south of the James and the beginning of the siege of Petersburg marked a crucial turning point in Lee’s own mind, J. Tracy Power argues that although extensive field fortifications limited Lee’s preference for the offensive, they were also “a formidable obstacle to an enemy hoping to destroy his army.” Even in the trenches around Petersburg, writes Power, “it was clear to most of Lee’s soldiers that the end was nowhere in sight.” And even in early February 1865, after the fighting along Hatcher’s Run, many in the ANV “could claim success” in being able to prevent Grant from gaining a permanent foothold on the vital Boydton Plank Road. Echoing Freeman’s own point that many in the ANV remained hopeful in late 1864 early 1865, Power writes that “all was not despair, defeat, disaffection, and desertion in the camps of Lee’s army, for there were still stalwart Confederates, more optimistic than most, who believed that the cause was not yet still lost if the Southern people would only support the armies in the field.”
Freeman’s emphasis on Lee’s hopes of success once free from the constraints imposed on him by the Petersburg trenches continues to find a voice in recent histories. “Freed of the yoke of Richmond, of maintaining his men in miles of dismal trenches, writes Jay Winik, “he [Lee] was determined to rescue the South’s battered and bloodied sons.” This could be done, according to Winik, by taking advantage of the lengthening of Grant’s supply lines as he moved further west in pursuit and Lee’s knowledge of the Virginia countryside. Even after a ten-month siege, many of Lee’s men “press on,” despite the fact that they have no idea of the campaign’s outcome. “Even the forced abandonment of the Petersburg lines,” contends Wiley Sword, “wouldn’t necessarily be fatal, provided the army could be maintained in an ‘efficient condition.’” Finally, William Marvel concludes that until April 6, “the army had maintained a measure of its old esprit.”
Why historians have failed to acknowledge Freeman’s break with earlier Lost Cause histories is difficult to understand. This difficulty can perhaps be traced to the fact that it is so easy to read R.E. Lee as a product of Lost Cause assumptions. Freeman’s own personal ties to the Civil War generation, including his own father, who surrendered with Lee at Appomattox, are reasons to connect him with that earlier generation. Freeman’s early years were spent in Lynchburg, Virginia where he listened to stories by veterans, including Jubal Early. On moving to Richmond in 1891, Freeman was exposed regularly to reunions, parades, and other events involving Civil War veterans. Freeman himself referred to one reunion, which took place on the battlefield at Petersburg in 1903 when he was seventeen. “If someone doesn’t write the story of these men,” Freeman wrote after being moved by their presence, “it will be lost forever, and I’m going to do it.” Not surprisingly, this personal connection to the veterans, shaped Freeman’s understanding of the war in Virginia and the men who fought it; it also forged a connection with earlier Lost Cause histories, which emphasized the fighting prowess of both the army and its leaders.
Understanding how Freeman was able to make specific breaks with earlier Lost Cause histories is also difficult to pin down. Perhaps, most importantly is the fact that Freeman’s most important contributions to Civil War history, including R.E. Lee and Lee’s Lieutenants were written roughly seventy years after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Histories such as those written by Jubal Early and other Lost Cause advocates should be seen as an extension of the war; their focus was not just on telling what they believed was a true story, but on vindicating their own involvement in the war and the cause for which they fought. This makes their interpretations “heroic” and highly moral in character. For Freeman, writing throughout the first half of the twentieth century, it is safe to say that the outcome of the event, as understood in earlier histories of the war “was no longer in question as it was for the first generation” of Lost Cause writers. Though he maintained a personal commitment to share the stories of the veterans he observed in Petersburg as a young man, Freeman could begin to see beyond a story that needed simply to be morally justified.
Historians’ attitudes regarding Freeman’s place in Civil War history fall on opposite ends of a spectrum. On one side, revisionist historians emphasize Freeman’s interpretive flaws, while on the other side, historians such as Robert Krick acknowledge Freeman as the “starting point for [any] study of R.E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.” This polarization reflects the need for more detailed studies of the interpretive assumptions employed by Freeman in understanding the life and eventual defeat of Lee and the ANV. Such studies may give us a more accurate picture of why much of Freeman’s overall interpretation continues to resonate in Civil War studies.
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